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Game Theory

Yale ECON 159, Ben Polak · Economics · Spring 2029 · Planned

Lectures

  1. Lecture 1: Introduction: Five First Lessons (1:08:33)
  2. Lecture 2: Putting Yourself in Other People's Shoes (1:08:49)
  3. Lecture 3: Iterative Deletion and the Median-Voter Theorem (1:01:19)
  4. Lecture 4: Best Responses in Soccer and Business Partnerships (1:12:05)
  5. Lecture 5: Nash Equilibrium, Bad Fashion, and Bank Runs (1:09:14)
  6. Lecture 6: Nash Equilibrium in Dating and Cournot Duopoly (1:12:06)
  7. Lecture 7: Bertrand Competition and the Candidate-Voter Model (1:11:21)
  8. Lecture 8: Location, Segregation, and Mixed Strategies (1:13:50)
  9. Lecture 9: Mixed strategies in theory and tennis (1:12:53)
  10. Lecture 10: Mixed strategies in baseball, dating and paying your taxes (1:13:32)
  11. Lecture 11: Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation, and equilibrium (1:12:06)
  12. Lecture 12: Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles (1:06:06)
  13. Lecture 13: Sequential Games, Moral Hazard, and Commitment (1:10:32)
  14. Lecture 14: Backward Induction, Commitment, and First-Mover Advantage (1:07:06)
  15. Lecture 15: Zermelo's Theorem and Games of Perfect Information (1:12:39)
  16. Lecture 16: Reputation, the Chain Store Paradox, and Duels (1:15:41)
  17. Lecture 17: Backward Induction: Ultimatums and Bargaining (1:10:44)
  18. Lecture 18: Imperfect Information, Information Sets and Subgame Perfection (1:15:57)
  19. Lecture 19: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Matchmaking and Strategic Investments (1:17:09)
  20. Lecture 20: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Wars of Attrition (1:15:36)
  21. Lecture 21: Repeated Games - Cooperation vs. the End Game (1:15:19)
  22. Lecture 22: Repeated Games - Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing (1:15:47)
  23. Lecture 23: Asymmetric Information - Signaling and Silence (1:10:36)
  24. Lecture 24: Asymmetric Information - Auctions and the Winner's Curse (1:02:28)

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