7.1 Free Will, Determinism and Choice

What this lecture covers

This lecture opens the unit on free will by setting out the conceptual landscape: what determinism claims, how libertarians, hard determinists and compatibilists disagree about whether free will requires that determinism be false, and how the influential 'consequent argument' tries to show determinism rules out free will. It then examines Harry Frankfurt's challenge to the assumption that freedom requires being able to do otherwise, and closes by showing how slippery the ordinary notion of 'choice' really is.

By the end, you should be able to define determinism, place libertarianism, hard determinism and (soft) determinist compatibilism on the map, reconstruct the consequent argument and the compatibilist reply, and explain what a Frankfurt case shows about the connection between freedom and being able to do otherwise.

Key ideas

• Determinism: the thesis that every event is fixed by prior causes and the laws of nature, so that given the state of the world before an event and the causal laws, that event was inevitable.
• The positions on the map: libertarians hold we have morally significant free will and therefore determinism is false; hard determinists hold determinism is true and therefore we lack free will; compatibilists hold free will and determinism can both be true, and soft determinists are compatibilists who also believe determinism is actually true.
• The consequent argument: if determinism is true, every action is a consequence of the laws of nature and prior conditions, neither of which I can change, so I could not have done otherwise, and therefore lack free will.
• Two readings of 'could do otherwise': the incompatibilist reads it as requiring that, in that exact situation, a different outcome was causally possible; the compatibilist reads it as requiring only that a different outcome would have followed from a different preference or choice.
• Frankfurt's challenge: freedom may not require being able to do otherwise at all; in the locked-door example, an action can be free even though, unknown to the agent, no alternative was actually available.
• The evil-scientist case: if someone would have intervened to force a particular outcome, but the agent freely chooses that outcome anyway before any intervention is needed, the action still seems free despite being inevitable.
• The slipperiness of 'choice': everyday claims like 'I had no choice' can mean physical compulsion, non-rational determination, determination by one's own desires and reasoning, or simply that the right answer was obvious, and these are easily conflated in free will debates.
• The paradigm case argument: since we learn the word 'choice' from ordinary cases, like a child choosing a pudding, it is an abuse of the word to deny that such paradigm cases involve a choice, though this settles a point about meaning rather than the deep metaphysical question.

Walkthrough

Determinism and moral responsibility (0:12)

The lecture opens with the everyday link between freedom and moral responsibility: we typically excuse people for what they are forced to do. Science makes it plausible that our actions have underlying causes in the brain, raising the question of whether being causally determined is compatible with being properly blamed or praised. Determinism is defined as the thesis that every event is fixed by prior causes and natural law, illustrated with Hume's claim that this is uncontroversial for matter and, more controversially, for human action too.

Mapping the positions (2:14)

Millican distinguishes libertarians (free will requires that determinism be false, and we do have free will), hard determinists (determinism is true, so we lack free will), and compatibilists (free will and determinism can coexist). Soft determinists are compatibilists who also accept determinism, and the lecture notes that libertarians and hard determinists actually agree on the underlying conceptual claim that determinism and freedom are incompatible; they only disagree about the facts.

The consequent argument (5:17)

Associated with Peter van Inwagen, the consequent argument reasons that if determinism is true, my actions are consequences of the laws of nature and prior conditions, neither of which I can change, so I cannot do otherwise than I actually do, and therefore lack free will. The standard compatibilist reply reinterprets 'could do otherwise' as meaning I would have acted differently under different preferences, rather than requiring a different outcome in the exact same circumstances.

Frankfurt cases (8:20)

Harry Frankfurt argues that freedom may not require the possibility of doing otherwise at all. In the locked-door example, someone freely goes through door A, unaware that door B was locked and no alternative was really available, yet the action still seems free. A more elaborate case adds a manipulator who would intervene only if the agent chose against his wishes; if the agent freely does what the manipulator wants anyway, the action is free even though it was inevitable, since intervention was never triggered.

The many meanings of 'choice' (12:22)

Using examples like a mugging at gunpoint and a scientist who can predict an angry outburst from brain scans, the lecture shows how 'I had no choice' can mean physical compulsion, being forced by non-rational factors, being determined by one's own desires and reasoning, or just that the right answer was obvious. The paradigm case argument closes the lecture: since we learn the meaning of 'choice' from ordinary cases like a child picking a pudding, denying that such cases involve real choice stretches the word past what it can bear, though Millican stresses this argument settles a question about meaning, not the deeper metaphysical dispute.

Before you watch

• No prior lecture in this course is strictly required, but familiarity with Hume's views on causation, from earlier lectures, helps with the quotation used here.
• Have a basic grasp of the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions, since the consequent argument turns on this distinction.

Check your understanding

1. State determinism precisely, and explain how libertarians, hard determinists and compatibilists each respond to it.
2. Reconstruct the consequent argument and the compatibilist's alternative reading of 'could have done otherwise'.
3. What does the locked-door Frankfurt case show about the relationship between freedom and the ability to do otherwise?
4. List at least three different things a person might mean by saying 'I had no choice', and explain why this matters for the free will debate.
5. What is the paradigm case argument, and what does Millican think it can and cannot establish?