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General Philosophy · Lecture 27 of 33 · 14:06

7.2 Different Concepts of Freedom

7.2 Different Concepts of Freedom on YouTube

Study guide

What this lecture covers

Continuing the free will unit, this lecture examines Hobbes's compatibilist definition of freedom as absence of external hindrance, then the 'contrastive argument' used by compatibilists to argue that freedom should be contrasted with constraint rather than with causation. It goes on to show that Hume's actual notion of liberty, despite common misreadings, is even more minimal than the contrastive argument suggests, and closes with a bank-robbery example that separates responsibility from blame.

You'll come away able to state Hobbes's definition of freedom, explain the contrastive argument, distinguish Hume's three concepts of freedom, and use the safe-cracking example to separate being morally responsible for an action from being blameworthy for it.

Key ideas

  • Hobbes's definition: a free person is one not hindered, by external impediments, from doing what they have a will to do; this is compatible with determinism because being causally determined to want something does not stop you doing it.
  • The contrastive argument: compatibilists argue the relevant contrast for freedom is not caused versus uncaused, but coerced, compelled or constrained versus free of such influences.
  • Hume's actual view: unlike some readings suggest, Hume does not use the contrastive argument; his minimal notion of liberty is simply the power to act or not act according to the determinations of the will, which everyone has unless literally imprisoned in chains.
  • Three concepts of freedom: contracausal libertarian free will (opposed to determinism), intentional agency (acting because your will leads you to), and absence of unwelcome restrictions (the everyday sense involving coercion and compulsion).
  • Intentional agency as the key to morality: Hume treats the second concept, acting from your own will, as what actually matters for moral responsibility, not the absence of constraint.
  • The bank-safe example: opening a safe because gangsters threaten your family is coerced, yet you still choose to open it; the lecture argues you remain morally responsible, but are not blameworthy, because opening the safe was the right thing to do.
  • Four ways of leaving a lecture: being carried out (no agency, not responsible), leaving at gunpoint (responsible but not blameworthy, since it was right), fleeing in panic (responsible, mitigated), and faking illness to escape (responsible and blameworthy).

Walkthrough

Hobbes's compatibilism (0:10)

Hobbes defines freedom as the absence of external hindrance to doing what you will, a definition that fits ordinary usage and is compatible with determinism, since being causally determined to want something is no obstacle to actually doing it.

The contrastive argument (1:10)

The contrastive argument, used by Hobbes and later philosophers like A. J. Ayer, claims the meaningful contrast is between coerced and free action, not caused and uncaused action, since we naturally excuse people who were compelled or constrained rather than people whose actions were simply caused.

Hume's minimal liberty and three concepts of freedom (4:14)

The lecture corrects a common misreading: Hume does not rely on the contrastive argument, but defines liberty purely as the power to act according to the determinations of the will, a condition only a literal prisoner in chains lacks. This motivates distinguishing contracausal libertarian freedom, intentional agency, and freedom from unwelcome restriction, with Hume treating intentional agency as what grounds moral responsibility.

Coercion, responsibility and blame (7:16)

Through the example of opening a bank safe under threat to one's family, and four contrasting ways of leaving a lecture, the lecture argues that coercion does not remove responsibility for an intentional action, but it can mean the action was the right one to take, so that the agent is responsible yet not blameworthy.

Before you watch

  • Watch "7.1 Free Will, Determinism and Choice" first, since this lecture builds directly on the definitions of determinism and compatibilism introduced there.

Check your understanding

  1. How does Hobbes define freedom, and why is that definition compatible with determinism?
  2. What is the contrastive argument, and why does the lecture say Hume does not actually use it?
  3. List Hume's three concepts of freedom, and explain which one he treats as central to moral responsibility.
  4. Using the bank-safe example, explain the difference between being morally responsible for an action and being blameworthy for it.

Chapters

From the YouTube description

A series of lectures delivered by Peter Millican to first-year philosophy students at the University of Oxford. The lectures comprise the 8-week General Philosophy course and were delivered in late 2009 and 2010.

← 7.1 Free Will, Determinism and Choice · 7.3 Hume on Liberty and Necessity →