5.1 Introduction to Knowledge

What this lecture covers

This lecture opens the course's topic on knowledge, moving on from the earlier discussion of skepticism. Millican explains why defining a more moderate, ordinary threshold for knowledge matters once Cartesian skepticism has shown that near-total certainty is unattainable, then steps back to examine what philosophers are really asking when they pose "what is X?" questions such as "what is knowledge?"

You'll come away able to explain why conceptual questions like "what is knowledge?" go beyond mere questions about word usage, and identify the methods—linguistic intuitions, puzzle cases, argument and systematization—that philosophers use to answer them.

Key ideas

• Moderating the threshold for knowledge: since Cartesian-level certainty rules out almost everything, philosophers look for a more reasonable standard that still distinguishes knowledge from mere belief.
• "What is X?" questions: a recurring philosophical form, associated with Socrates, asking for the nature of concepts like knowledge or freedom, not just how a word is used.
• The geography analogy: whether a discipline "really" includes some subject matter can look like a purely linguistic question, illustrating the puzzle of what "what is X?" questions are asking beyond usage.
• The normative aspect of knowledge: calling a belief "knowledge" isn't just labeling it—it implies the belief is reliable and has genuine authority, so someone can be wrong to claim they "know" something even if they use the word.
• Strawson on induction revisited: Strawson's claim that inductive methods just are what we mean by "reasonable" is challenged by the view that calling an inference reasonable claims real normative force, not just conformity to a label.
• Linguistic intuitions: native speakers' natural judgments about how words apply carry some authority for staying "on the rails" of correct usage, even if they don't settle deeper philosophical truth.
• Puzzle cases (intuition pumps): hypothetical scenarios designed to draw out and test intuitions, often constructed by opposing sides to favor their own view.
• Propositional knowledge vs other kinds: philosophers distinguish knowledge by acquaintance, knowing how, and knowing that (propositional knowledge), with the course focused on the last.

Before you watch

• Recall the earlier lectures on Descartes and scepticism of the external world, since Millican frames this topic as picking up from the failure of Cartesian answers to skepticism.
• Recall Strawson's analytic justification of induction from the induction lectures, which is revisited here as an example of the "what is X?" puzzle.

Check your understanding

1. Why does Millican think we need a more moderate threshold for knowledge than the one Descartes was seeking?
2. What is the difference between asking "when do we apply the word knowledge?" and asking "what is knowledge?"
3. Why does Millican say the concept of knowledge has a normative aspect?
4. How are puzzle cases (intuition pumps) used in philosophical argument, according to the lecture?
5. What is the difference between propositional knowledge and "knowing how"?