20. Contemporary Communitarianism (I)

What this lecture covers

The course moves from Burke and Devlin's traditionalist anti-Enlightenment to a second strand of anti-Enlightenment thought: contemporary communitarianism, represented here by Alasdair MacIntyre. The lecture introduces MacIntyre's background and his book After Virtue, then works through the two symptoms he diagnoses in modern moral life: emotivism, where moral disagreement collapses into mere taste, and the triumph of instrumentalism, where means are separated from ends. It closes by introducing MacIntyre's key concepts of practice and virtue.

After watching, you should be able to explain what communitarianism shares with Burkean traditionalism and how it differs, state what emotivism is and why MacIntyre sees continued moral argument as a puzzle given it, and define a "practice" and how virtues relate to goods internal to a practice.

Key ideas

• Communitarianism: like Burke and Devlin, MacIntyre holds that the individual is subordinate to a community, but the emphasis falls on community-accepted values rather than inherited tradition as such.
• MacIntyre's trajectory: he moved from an early Marxist and Christian upbringing through a conventional Marxism to a mature rejection of the whole Enlightenment project, settling into a mix of Aristotelianism and the Catholic tradition.
• Emotivism: the view, traced to Charles Stevenson's critique of David Hume, that moral judgments are only expressions of subjective feeling, with no rational way to adjudicate between them.
• The Crossfire puzzle: MacIntyre notes that people argue about moral questions like abortion as though there were a right answer, using reasons and evidence, even though the surrounding emotivist culture assumes no such answer exists.
• Instrumentalism and lost teleology: modern life, exemplified by the rise of business schools, increasingly separates skills and methods (means) from any judgment about worthwhile purposes (ends).
• Humans want a point: MacIntyre argues people are inherently teleological, needing narratives that give their activities purpose, which is why a purely instrumental, agnostic-about-goals culture leaves people dissatisfied.
• Practice: a socially established, cooperative human activity, such as a university class or a game of chess, that precedes and is inherited by its participants rather than being invented by them.
• Virtue: an acquired quality that enables a person to achieve goods internal to a practice, such as excelling at chess by the game's own standards rather than by cheating.

Walkthrough

Introduction: Alasdair MacIntyre and Contemporary Communitarianism (0:00)

Shapiro opens with a methodological note: students are not responsible for the many historical figures MacIntyre engages, such as Aquinas, Nietzsche, and Aristotle, only for MacIntyre's own argument. He then introduces MacIntyre's biography, from an early Marxist and Christian formation through a conventional Marxist phase to his mature rejection of the Enlightenment project in After Virtue, published in 1984.

Alasdair MacIntyre and Other Anti-enlightenment Thinkers (5:25)

MacIntyre is placed among a broader group of anti-Enlightenment thinkers, including Richard Rorty and Michael Walzer, grouped under the label communitarianism. Shapiro distinguishes communitarianism from Burke and Devlin's traditionalism: both hold the individual subordinate to community, but communitarians appeal to community-accepted values rather than inherited tradition as the basis for what should guide us. Rorty's argument that the Enlightenment quest for certainty was a "fool's errand," and his warning that failing to meet an impossible justificatory standard erodes confidence in legitimate institutions, is summarized as background, alongside Shapiro's own view that MacIntyre is the stronger political theorist of the two.

A Closer Look at MacIntyre's Book (12:13)

Shapiro explains the book's unusual structure: it moves backward in time, from the present to antiquity, because MacIntyre believes the Western intellectual project went off the rails around the start of the Enlightenment. This parallels the course's earlier discussion of Locke's workmanship model: once a coherent, theologically grounded framework is secularized and taken apart piece by piece, it loses the assumptions that gave it coherence, a problem MacIntyre thinks also happened to inherited ideas about morality.

Emotivism: From Subjective Certainty to Relativist Morality (16:18)

The first symptom of the modern condition, in MacIntyre's account, is emotivism: moral disagreements reduced to differences in taste, following Charles Stevenson's subjectivist challenge to David Hume. Shapiro connects this to the class's earlier discussion of the shift from early to mature Enlightenment thought. He then presents MacIntyre's puzzle: people still argue about issues like abortion as if there were a correct answer, appealing to reasons and evidence, even though the emotivist culture that surrounds them assumes no such answer can be found. Using the format of the television show Crossfire as an illustration, Shapiro suggests that this persistent, unresolved style of moral argument is itself a symptom that something has gone wrong, since people do not seem genuinely comfortable with pure subjectivism.

Instrumentalism Has Triumphed: A Separation between Means and Ends (22:52)

The second symptom is the separation of means from ends, illustrated by the modern rise of business schools that teach management skills applicable to any enterprise, indifferent to whether that enterprise is worthwhile. Shapiro links this back to the course's earlier discussion of Eichmann, who wanted to be a good, efficient manager regardless of what he was managing.

Emotivism and the Rejection of Teleology (28:04)

Shapiro argues that human beings are inherently teleological, needing a sense of purpose or point to their activities, illustrated by the absurdity of narrating a pointless morning walk. He draws on MacIntyre's related essay on children's explanations of the world to suggest that even scientific explanations take narrative form for us. Rousseau's line about designing institutions by "taking men as they are and laws as they might be" is used to show what MacIntyre finds objectionable in purely instrumental thinking: it ignores how morality shapes human nature in the first place.

Some Definitions: Practice and Virtue (41:24)

The lecture closes by introducing MacIntyre's two key analytical tools. A practice is a socially established, cooperative activity, such as a university course or a game of chess, that exists before any individual participant and is inherited rather than invented, which MacIntyre thinks makes the social contract metaphor misleading. A virtue is a quality that enables someone to achieve goods internal to a practice, illustrated by the idea of a "pitcher's pitcher," someone whose excellence is recognized by those who truly understand the practice's own internal standards, as opposed to winning by external means like cheating.

Before you watch

• Review the previous lecture on Burke and Devlin, since MacIntyre and communitarianism are introduced as a related but distinct strand of anti-Enlightenment thought.
• Recall the course's earlier discussion of classical versus neoclassical utilitarianism and Charles Stevenson's emotivist critique.
• Keep the Eichmann case from early in the course in mind, since it reappears as an example of pure instrumentalism.

Check your understanding

1. How does communitarianism differ from Burke and Devlin's appeal to tradition, according to Shapiro?
2. What is emotivism, and why does MacIntyre think the persistence of serious moral argument is puzzling given it?
3. What does the rise of business schools illustrate about the separation of means from ends?
4. Why does MacIntyre think human beings need a sense of teleology or purpose?
5. What is the difference between an internal and an external good in MacIntyre's account of a practice, using the chess example?