Lecture 16: Dying Alone; The Badness of Death, Part I

What this lecture covers

The lecture opens by finishing the previous discussion of whether people truly believe they will die, considering one further argument: that people who have near-death experiences often radically change their priorities, which suggests the rest of us don't fully believe in our own mortality day to day. Kagan finds this argument more plausible than earlier ones but still inconclusive, then moves to the bulk of the lecture: a sustained, systematic takedown of the claim that "everyone dies alone."

The second half pivots to value theory, the topic that occupies the rest of the course. Having spent the first half of the class establishing the physicalist, metaphysical picture of death (the body breaks and P-functioning ends), the lecture now asks why death is bad. It considers and rejects the idea that death's badness lies mainly in what it does to survivors, using a thought experiment about two possible ways of losing a friend, and closes by posing the real question: how can death be bad for the person who dies, given that once dead they don't exist?

Key ideas

• The near-death-experience argument: people who survive close brushes with death often reorder their priorities, which is some (not conclusive) evidence that ordinary life is lived without fully believing in one's own mortality.
• "Everyone dies alone" as a philosophical test case: Kagan uses this famous-sounding claim to model how to test whether a profound-sounding statement is actually true, necessary, and distinctively about death.
• Literal "not in the presence of others" fails: people demonstrably do die surrounded by others, such as Socrates dying among his friends in Plato's Phaedo.
• "Dying can't be a joint undertaking" fails: joint suicides and suicide pacts show dying together, as a coordinated joint act, is possible.
• "Nobody can take my place" is trivially true of everything: the same logic applies to getting your own haircut or eating your own lunch, so it says nothing special about death.
• The psychological/metaphor reading also fails: the idea that everyone feels lonely or alienated while dying is refuted by counterexamples like Socrates and David Hume, who died calm and sociable.
• Survivor-based accounts of death's badness are incomplete: the "spaceship" thought experiment shows that mere permanent separation from a friend isn't as bad as that friend actually dying, so separation alone can't explain death's badness.
• The real question going forward: if death is the end and I no longer exist once dead, how can death be bad for me, the person who died?

Walkthrough

Finishing the "nobody believes they'll die" discussion (0:02)

Kagan recaps Ivan Ilyich as a plausible individual case and asks what evidence could show the pattern is widespread. He tests a "compulsive behavior" analogy and a claim that true belief in death would cause uncontrollable screaming, rejecting both for lacking support. He then considers the strongest version: people who survive brushes with death often say they will change how they live, and the fact that most of us don't live that way, despite claiming to believe we're mortal, is some evidence we don't fully believe it. Kagan calls this argument worth taking seriously but leaves it unresolved.

Introducing "everyone dies alone" (8:15)

The lecture sets up its central puzzle: is there any reading of "everyone dies alone" that is true, necessarily true, interesting, and specific to death rather than trivially true of everything? Kagan quotes the claim from a folk song and a novel to show it's a genuinely common sentiment, not a strawman.

Testing literal interpretations (13:24)

Working through the claim literally - dying not in the presence of others - Kagan points to Socrates' death surrounded by friends as a clear counterexample. A second reading, that dying itself (as opposed to being present) can't be shared, is refuted by battlefield deaths happening simultaneously, and a third reading, that dying can't be a coordinated joint undertaking, is refuted by joint suicide pacts, which function like a string quartet playing together.

"Nobody can take my place" (20:32)

Kagan considers the idea that nobody can substitute for you in your own death, illustrating with the Tale of Two Cities plot where one man takes another's place at the guillotine. Even here, substitution turns out to be possible in a meaningful sense. When refined to "nobody can undergo my death for me," the claim becomes true but trivial - the same is true of getting a haircut, having kidney stones removed, or eating lunch, so it reveals nothing special about death itself.

The psychological reading (28:45)

A final attempt treats "dying alone" as a metaphor for a feeling of loneliness or alienation while dying. Kagan tests this against people who die in their sleep, die suddenly and unaware, or die calm and sociable, such as Socrates or the philosopher David Hume, and finds no version of the claim that holds up. He concludes the whole slogan is essentially nonsense, unreflective language.

Turning to value theory: is death bad? (35:00)

Kagan summarizes the metaphysical picture built over the first half of the course - physicalism, P-functioning, the body breaking as the end of personhood - and announces the shift to ethical questions: is death bad, and if so why, plus later questions about immortality, fear of death, how to live given death, and suicide.

Why separation from survivors isn't the central badness (41:09)

Kagan considers the view that death's badness lies in what it does to the people left behind, quoting a Klopstock poem about the pain of losing friends. He tests this with two spaceship scenarios: in one, a friend leaves forever with no possibility of contact; in the other, the friend's ship explodes shortly after launch. The second is clearly worse, even though the loss of future contact is identical in both - showing that the badness of death for the dying person must be more than the badness of separation for survivors.

Before you watch

• This lecture assumes the physicalist account of personhood and the "brokenness" definition of death developed in the immediately preceding lecture.
• Familiarity with Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Ilyich, discussed in the prior lecture, is helpful for the opening section.
• Knowing the death scene of Socrates in Plato's Phaedo (read earlier in the course) helps with the "dying alone" examples.

Check your understanding

1. What is the strongest argument Kagan considers for thinking people don't fully believe they will die, and why does he think it's still inconclusive?
2. List three different interpretations of "everyone dies alone" that Kagan tests, and explain why each one fails.
3. Why does Kagan say "nobody can die my death for me" is true but not philosophically interesting?
4. Using the two spaceship stories, explain why the badness of death cannot simply be the badness of permanent separation from friends.
5. Why does Kagan think the fact that death ends your existence makes it puzzling to explain how death could be bad for you?