Lecture 1: Course Introduction

What this lecture covers

This opening lecture sets up the whole course. Shelly Kagan explains that this is a philosophy class on death, not a psychological or sociological one: it will not cover grief, the funeral industry, or the stages of dying. Instead it asks philosophical questions about what death is and whether it is bad, using reason rather than religious authority.

After watching, you should understand the two halves of the course (metaphysics, then value theory), know the specific claims Kagan intends to argue for, and understand how the class is graded and structured, since these logistics shape how you should approach every later lecture.

Key ideas

• Metaphysics vs. value theory: the first half of the course asks what death is and whether we have souls; the second half asks whether death is bad and how that should affect how we live.
• Personal identity: to understand survival and death, you first have to understand what makes someone the same person over time.
• The 'common view' Kagan will argue against: that we have an immaterial soul, that immortality would be good, that death should be feared, and that suicide is always immoral and irrational.
• Secular method: the course reasons about death without appeal to religious revelation or authority, treating the whole class as a hypothetical about what a secular argument can establish.
• Argumentative, not neutral, teaching style: Kagan states he will defend specific positions rather than presenting all views neutrally, and invites disagreement as long as you engage with the arguments.
• Grading structure: three five-page papers (75% of the grade, with later papers weighted more heavily if you improve) and discussion-section participation (25%).

Walkthrough

What the course does and doesn't cover (1:02)

Kagan opens by inviting students to call him Shelly, then explains what a psychological or sociological course on death might cover that this one won't: the stages of dying, the funeral industry, grieving, and cultural attitudes toward the dying. He tells students looking for that kind of class that they still have time to find another one, and previews that this class instead asks philosophical questions about the nature of death.

Metaphysics then value theory (3:06)

He lays out the course's two halves. The first half is metaphysics: what we are, whether we have an immaterial soul, what it means to survive, and what personal identity consists of. The second half is value theory: whether death is bad given that "I" won't exist to be harmed by it, whether immortality would be good, how the fact of death should affect how you live, and whether suicide can be rational or moral.

The common view Kagan will argue against (8:08)

Kagan describes two ways to teach an introductory class - presenting views neutrally, or arguing for a specific position - and states he will take the second approach. He then summarizes a cluster of beliefs many students likely hold: that we have a soul, that we may survive death, that immortality would be wonderful, that death should be met with fear and despair, and that suicide is always immoral and irrational. He states plainly that he will argue this entire package is largely mistaken, while stressing that the point of the class is for students to think for themselves, not simply agree with him. He also excludes religious authority as a form of evidence, framing the course as a hypothetical about what secular reasoning alone can establish.

Course format, readings, and participation (14:15)

He walks through logistics: two lectures a week plus one weekly discussion section, the syllabus and its reading assignments (a mix of books and a course-pack), and the new online discussion-section registration system, warning students that finding a workable section time is required to stay enrolled. He explicitly invites questions during lecture, noting that if one student is confused, many others likely are too, and says he'll continue discussion informally after class or in office hours.

Grading and the reputation for harsh grading (20:27)

Kagan addresses his reputation as a harsh grader directly, noting Yale doesn't publish grading averages, and explains what letter grades mean in his class: B means good, A means excellent work showing some flair (not "publishable" or exceptional by professional standards), C is satisfactory, and D or F reflect papers where the vices outweigh the virtues. He warns that many students will receive lower grades on early papers than they're used to, framing this as an honest assessment meant to push students rather than let them coast.

Discussion sections and paper improvement policy (28:41)

He explains that three five-page papers officially count for 25% each of the grade, but later, stronger papers are weighted more heavily if a student improves over the semester, so a weak first paper need not be fatal. The remaining 25% comes from discussion-section participation, where respectful engagement can raise a grade but non-participation lowers it. He compares discussion sections to the conversation hour of a foreign-language class: the way to get better at philosophy is by talking about it, regardless of prior background.

Student evaluations (38:57)

Kagan closes by reading a series of real, anonymous student evaluations covering the lecture style, grading, and whether students would recommend the class, ranging from "one of the most mind-opening experiences of my life" to "a waste of a course." He uses the mixed reactions to acknowledge that the class is polarizing, and ends by inviting students back for the next lecture.

Before you watch

• No prior philosophy background is assumed; this is an introductory course.
• If you want the value-theory questions (is death bad, is immortality good, is suicide ever rational) to make sense later, note now that they depend on the metaphysical questions about personal identity covered in the first half.

Check your understanding

1. What kinds of questions about death does this course explicitly set aside, and why?
2. What is the difference between the 'metaphysics' and 'value theory' halves of the course?
3. Why does Kagan exclude religious authority as a source of evidence in the course's arguments?
4. What set of common beliefs about death does Kagan say he will argue are largely mistaken?