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General Philosophy · Lecture 29 of 33 · 9:48
7.4 Making Sense of Free Will and Moral Responsibility
Study guide
What this lecture covers
This short lecture closes the free will unit by asking whether determinism really is compatible with moral responsibility, given that indeterminism seems no better: random actions seem just as hard to hold someone responsible for as determined ones. It then presents two ways of refining the compatibilist picture, Hume's sentimentalism about morality and Frankfurt's distinction between first- and second-order desires, before briefly noting Robert Kane's attempt to defend a workable version of indeterminism.
Key ideas
- The libertarian's dilemma: if actions are undetermined, and effectively random, it is unclear why that randomness should make anyone more morally responsible than determinism does.
- Hume's sentimentalism: moral judgments are grounded in feelings, such as sympathy and resentment, not metaphysical argument, so learning that a wrongdoer's act was causally determined does not reduce our resentment toward them.
- First- and second-order desires: Frankfurt distinguishes a first-order desire, such as a smoker's desire for a cigarette, from a second-order desire about that desire, such as wanting to not want to smoke; an addict is unfree in a specific sense because their first-order desire overrides their second-order desire.
- Degrees of freedom within compatibilism: this distinction lets compatibilists explain why an addict is less free than an ordinary person, even though both act on desires they have.
- Robert Kane's indeterminism: using an unsteady gunman example, Kane argues that randomness in how conflicting desires resolve can still be compatible with responsibility, and can shape character over time, though the lecture notes it remains unclear why that randomness adds anything valuable.
Before you watch
- Watch "7.1 Free Will, Determinism and Choice" through "7.3 Hume on Liberty and Necessity" first, since this lecture assumes familiarity with compatibilism, hard determinism and Hume's account of liberty.
Check your understanding
- Why does the lecture suggest that indeterminism faces a version of the same problem it was meant to solve?
- Explain Hume's sentimentalist account of morality, and why it makes determinism less threatening to moral judgment.
- Using the smoking example, explain Frankfurt's distinction between first- and second-order desires.
- What does Robert Kane's gunman example try to show about randomness and responsibility?
From the YouTube description
A series of lectures delivered by Peter Millican to first-year philosophy students at the University of Oxford. The lectures comprise the 8-week General Philosophy course and were delivered in late 2009 and 2010.
← 7.3 Hume on Liberty and Necessity · 8.1 Introduction to Personal Identity →
