Seyed Masoud Hosseini · Overview · Study log · Weekly summaries · Ideas · Search · Transcript · RSS feed

General Philosophy · Lecture 29 of 33 · 9:48

7.4 Making Sense of Free Will and Moral Responsibility

7.4 Making Sense of Free Will and Moral Responsibility on YouTube

Study guide

What this lecture covers

This short lecture closes the free will unit by asking whether determinism really is compatible with moral responsibility, given that indeterminism seems no better: random actions seem just as hard to hold someone responsible for as determined ones. It then presents two ways of refining the compatibilist picture, Hume's sentimentalism about morality and Frankfurt's distinction between first- and second-order desires, before briefly noting Robert Kane's attempt to defend a workable version of indeterminism.

Key ideas

  • The libertarian's dilemma: if actions are undetermined, and effectively random, it is unclear why that randomness should make anyone more morally responsible than determinism does.
  • Hume's sentimentalism: moral judgments are grounded in feelings, such as sympathy and resentment, not metaphysical argument, so learning that a wrongdoer's act was causally determined does not reduce our resentment toward them.
  • First- and second-order desires: Frankfurt distinguishes a first-order desire, such as a smoker's desire for a cigarette, from a second-order desire about that desire, such as wanting to not want to smoke; an addict is unfree in a specific sense because their first-order desire overrides their second-order desire.
  • Degrees of freedom within compatibilism: this distinction lets compatibilists explain why an addict is less free than an ordinary person, even though both act on desires they have.
  • Robert Kane's indeterminism: using an unsteady gunman example, Kane argues that randomness in how conflicting desires resolve can still be compatible with responsibility, and can shape character over time, though the lecture notes it remains unclear why that randomness adds anything valuable.

Before you watch

  • Watch "7.1 Free Will, Determinism and Choice" through "7.3 Hume on Liberty and Necessity" first, since this lecture assumes familiarity with compatibilism, hard determinism and Hume's account of liberty.

Check your understanding

  1. Why does the lecture suggest that indeterminism faces a version of the same problem it was meant to solve?
  2. Explain Hume's sentimentalist account of morality, and why it makes determinism less threatening to moral judgment.
  3. Using the smoking example, explain Frankfurt's distinction between first- and second-order desires.
  4. What does Robert Kane's gunman example try to show about randomness and responsibility?

Vocabulary

dilemma (noun)
A difficult situation involving a choice between two unwelcome options.
The libertarian faces a dilemma about randomness and responsibility.
indeterminism (noun)
The view that not every event is fixed by prior causes; some events involve genuine chance.
Indeterminism allows for random, uncaused events.
sentimentalism (noun)
The view that moral judgments are based on feelings rather than pure reasoning.
Hume's sentimentalism grounds morality in feeling, not logic.
resentment (noun)
A feeling of anger or bitterness toward someone for a perceived wrong.
Resentment toward a wrongdoer doesn't disappear just because their act was determined.
first-order desire (noun)
A basic want for something, like wanting a specific object or action.
A smoker's first-order desire is wanting a cigarette.
second-order desire (noun)
A desire about one's own desires.
The addict has a second-order desire to not want to smoke.
override (verb)
To take control over and cancel out something else.
The addict's first-order desire overrides the second-order one.
unsteady (adjective)
Not firm or stable; likely to shake or waver.
Kane uses an unsteady gunman as an example of randomness.
resolve (a conflict) (verb)
To settle or bring an end to a disagreement or tension.
Randomness could determine how conflicting desires resolve.
refine (verb)
To improve something by making small, careful changes.
The lecture refines the compatibilist picture with two new ideas.
degree of freedom (phrase)
The extent or amount by which something is free to vary.
The distinction lets compatibilists explain degrees of freedom.
addict (noun)
A person who is unable to stop a harmful habit or craving.
An addict struggles against a strong first-order desire.
workable (version) (adjective)
Practical and able to function properly.
Kane tries to defend a workable version of indeterminism.
shape (character) (verb)
To influence or form the development of something over time.
Randomness can shape character over time, Kane argues.
unclear (why) (phrase)
Not obvious or easy to understand the reason for something.
It remains unclear why randomness adds anything valuable.
threatening (to morality) (adjective)
Posing a danger or challenge to something important.
Determinism seems threatening to moral judgment at first.
grounds (basis) (noun)
The reason or basis for a belief or claim.
Sentiment provides the grounds for moral judgment.
close (the unit) (verb)
To bring a section or topic to an end.
This lecture closes the free will unit.
conflicting (desires) (adjective)
Opposing or incompatible with each other.
The gunman example involves conflicting desires.
briefly note (phrase)
To mention something quickly without going into full detail.
The lecture briefly notes Kane's attempted defense.

From the YouTube description

A series of lectures delivered by Peter Millican to first-year philosophy students at the University of Oxford. The lectures comprise the 8-week General Philosophy course and were delivered in late 2009 and 2010.

← 7.3 Hume on Liberty and Necessity · 8.1 Introduction to Personal Identity →